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Right to Counsel: Balancing the Burden
of Persuasion on the Adversarial Scales
of Criminal Justice
How much is society willing to pay to protect constitutional rightsfrom government infringement? How much constitutional protec-
tion is society allowed to forfeit in exchange for more effective law
enforcement? The criminal justice system's allocation of the bur-
dens of proof ultimately decides these questions. When do effective
law enforcement tactics, such as undercover agent investigations,
violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel? When does the sixth amendment violation war-
rant judicial remedies? Only the government knows when and how
improperly obtained information is ultimately utilized. The adver-
sarial context of American criminal justice dictates allocating to
the government the burden of persuasion on the issue of whether
an intrusion into the defendant's right to counsel was unconstitu-
tionally prejudicial.
I. INTRODUCTION
Twelve years ago, in Weatherford v. Bursey,' the Supreme Court
established that judicial remedies for a violation of a defendant's
sixth amendment right to effective counsel require a showing of "at
least a realistic possibility ' 2 of prejudice to the defendant or benefit
to the prosecution.' The Court assigned the burden of production
upon the defendant, but the Court left unanswered the question of
who bears the burden of persuasion for establishing prejudice or. lack
thereof.4 The circuit courts have split into three diverse positions on
the appropriate allocation of the burdens of proof.5
1. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
2. Id. at 558.
3. Id. at 545.




This Comment will focus on sixth amendment violations which oc-
cur when government agents discover information about the defend-
ant by infringing upon a defendant's right to be represented by coun-
sel or by invading the defendant-attorney relationship. The
government's discovery methods are technically improper but may
be justified.6 The government agent may discover defense strategy
information.7 The defendant is prejudiced when this improperly ob-
tained information is used for the benefit of the prosecution or to the
detriment of the defendant." This Comment will discuss which party
must persuade the court when adjudicating whether a prejudicial
sixth amendment violation has occurred.9 Part Two will discuss the
Supreme Court's position. Part Three will identify the conflicting po-
sitions that have developed amongst the circuit courts. Part Four will
consider five factors to determine a fair and consistent method of
allocating the burden of persuasion. Part Five argues why this com-
6. The defense strategy is improperly obtained when the defendant reveals it to
a government agent without an opportunity to have her attorney present. For example,
Bonnie and Clyde rob a liquor store. Bonnie stays in the car, out of sight, while Clyde
goes in and robs the store. Bonnie is really an undercover agent. The two are arrested
and prosecuted for the crime. Their cases are severed and each retains counsel. Clyde
invites Bonnie to have lunch with Clyde and his attorney and discuss trial strategy.
Clyde's attorney advises Clyde that the only available defense is to attack the credibility
of the government's witnesses. Clyde's attorney explains the strategy of attack: the gov-
ernment witnesses' credibility will never hold up to cross examination because one is a
legally blind prostitute who is having an affair with the arresting officer, and the other is
her pimp, the liquor store clerk, who was arranging a drug deal on the phone when the
robbery occurred. The prosecution does not know this information because the witnesses
lied to the police about what they were doing when the robbery occurred. Bonnie may
legally testify that she drove Clyde to the liquor store. But Bonnie intrudes upon Clyde's
sixth amendment rights when she attends the attorney-client conference. The intrusion
may or may not be justified or prejudicial. But Bonnie violates Clyde's sixth amendment
rights, with prejudice, when Bonnie communicates to the prosecutor any defense strategy
details of the attorney conversation.
7. Defense strategy involves tactical decisions about how the defendant, and her
attorney, intend to defend her right to freedom. See generally Note, Government Intru-
sions into the Defense Camp: Undermining the Right to Counsel, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1143
(1984). A quintessential defense strategy is an alibi. A more sophisticated defense strat-
egy is an attack upon the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses. If the prosecution
knows before the trial that defendant's only plausible defense strategy is to attack the
credibility of the government's witnesses, the prosecution will be able to focus its efforts
on countering that specific defense. In short, anticipating the defendant's defense strat-
egy and knowing the defendant's defense strategy are not analogous within the adver-
sarial context of criminal trials. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 204 (3rd
Cir. 1978).
8. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
9. A question is often answered by the framing of the query. The reader should
note that the word prejudice has special connotations in the criminal procedure context.
The opposite of prejudice is harmless error. Generally, the defendant bears the burden of
persuasion on the issue of prejudice. The government generally bears the burden of per-
suasion on the issue of harmless error. Therefore, it is interesting that the dissenting
justices in Weatherford framed the question in terms of prejudice. This Comment will
explore the issues in terms of prejudice or lack thereof simply because that is the query
as posed by the dissenting justices.
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mentator believes the burden of persuasion should be allocated to the
government whenever the defendant has satisfied his burden of
production.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION
A. The Sixth Amendment
The sixth amendment provides that "the accused shall. . .have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."' 0 The assistance of coun-
sel for one's defense has evolved over time to include more than a
bare right to have an attorney present in the courtroom during crim-
inal proceedings. The right to counsel includes the right to confer
with one's lawyer"" and to prepare a legal defense without unjustified
government interference.12 The state has an obligation not to circum-
vent the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel.' 3
The sixth amendment provides a right to the assistance of counsel
during critical stages of criminal proceedings even though there is
neither interrogation by government agents nor a fifth amendment
violation.14 The arraignment or indictment initiates adversary judi-
cial proceedings and triggers the defendant's sixth amendment right
to the assistance of counsel. 5 The adversarial context involves com-
plicated substantive and procedural rules that ultimately distinguish
guilt in fact from guilt in law.' 6 Therefore, an innocent accused is no
longer capable of independently defending herself from criminal
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976).
12. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). "[Tlhe essence of the
Sixth Amendment [is]... privacy of communication with counsel." United States v.
Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
13. "[K]nowing exploitation by the State of an, opportunity to confront the ac-
cused without counsel being present is. . .a breach of the State's obligation not to cir-
cumvent the right to the assistance of counsel." Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176
(1985).
14. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). A fifth amendment violation
occurs whenever an accused is interrogated during police custody and after the accused
has either requested the presence of counsel or has expressed her desire to remain silent.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). By comparison, a criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel is violated whenever a government agent speaks to the de-
fendant without the presence of the defendant's counsel, unless the defendant has ex-
pressly waived her right to have counsel present. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398
(1977); See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
15. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972); see also United States v.
Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1974).
16. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
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prosecution. 17 Thus, a defendant is entitled to the help of a lawyer to
protect her from the prosecutorial arm of an organized state.
"ITjhe constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is of such
importance that the police [and government agents] may no longer
employ techniques for eliciting information from an uncounseled de-
fendant that might have been entirely proper at an earlier stage of
their investigation."18 The right to counsel attaches whether or not
the defendant expressly requests assistance.' 9 Methods of investiga-
tion that are permissible before arraignment and become potentially
violative of defendant's sixth amendment rights upon formal accusa-
tion include: government employing of a cellmate as an informant; 0
a codefendant employed as a government agent and present during
defendant-attorney communication; 2' a government agent speaking
to the defendant without the presence of defendant's counsel;22 an
undercover government agent present during defendant-attorney
communication;23 and electronic surveillance of defendant's conver-
sations with third parties.2 4 When these situations arise and a claim
of sixth amendment right to counsel violation is made, the courts
must determine whether a violation has occurred and whether a judi-
cial remedy is warranted. The courts' decisions implicitly require al-
location of the burdens of proof on each issue.2"
17. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). "The Sixth Amendment
stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost,
justice will not still be done." Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
18. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986).
19. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981); Cinelli v. City of
Revere, 820 F.2d 474 (Ist Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Cutillo v. Cinelli, 485 U.S.
1037 (1988); United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 1017 (1985); United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980).
23. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); United States v. Mas-
troianni, 749 F.2d 900 (1st Cir. 1984).
24. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
25. The burdens of proof include two separate and distinct burdens: (1) the bur-
den of production, and (2) the burden of persuasion. The burden of production involves
the burden of bringing forward argument or evidence in support of a proposition. The
test to determine who bears the burden of production considers which party would be
successful if no evidence at all were given, or if no more evidence were given at a particu-
lar point in a case. The burden of production is inherently dynamic and may shift many
times throughout the litigation. The burden shifts whenever one party has produced
enough evidence to produce a prima facie case in their favor.
The burden of persuasion requires one party to establish a proposition as against all
counterarguments. The burden of persuasion on a particular issue remains attached to
the same party throughout the litigation; it does not shift. Thus the burden of persuasion
may or may not be allocated to the same party who bears the burden of production.
Thayer, The Burdens of Proof, 4 HARV. L. REv. 45 (1890).
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B. Weatherford v. Bursey: Defendant Bears Burden of
Production on Issue of Sixth Amendment Violation
Weatherford and Bursey were arrested for vandalizing a Selective
Service office. Weatherford was an undercover agent for South Car-
olina State Law Enforcement Division. He was arrested and charged
in order to maintain his undercover status and protect his personal
safety. He retained counsel for the same reasons. Bursey was later
released on bail and retained his own counsel. After arraignment and
before trial, Bursey invited Weatherford to attend defense strategy
meetings between Bursey and his counsel. Weatherford attended two
such meetings.2 6 Bursey was convicted.
After Bursey served his sentence, he brought an action against
Weatherford, 27 alleging deprivation of effective assistance of coun-
sel.28 The district court found for Weatherford.2 9 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, but did not disturb the district court's
factual findings. 30 The Supreme Court reversed.31 The Court re-
jected the Fourth Circuit's prophylactic per se rule.3 2 The Court
noted that the per se rule failed to consider the following: (1) The
agent's purpose in attending the meeting;3 (2) whether the agent
reported to his superiors any details or information regarding the
26. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 547-49.
27. The action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
28. Bursey alleged that Weatherford's participation in the attorney-client meet-
ings had deprived Bursey "of the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 545.
29. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 545
(1977).
30. Id.
31. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
32. The Fourth Circuit's prophylactic rule asserted that "whenever the prosecu-
tion knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client relationship the
right to counsel is sufficiently endangered to require reversal and a new trial." Id. at 549
(quoting Bursey, 528 F.2d at 486). The Court also rejected the government's argument
that "[w]henever a defendant converses with his counsel in the presence of a third party
thought to be a confederate and ally, the defendant assumes the risk and cannot com-
plain if the third party turns out to be an informer for the government who has reported
on the conversations to the prosecution and who testifies about them at the defendant's
trial." Id. at 554.
33. Id. at 550.
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plaintiff's trial plans, strategy, or anything having to do with the
criminal action pending against plaintiff;3 4 (3) whether any of the
state's evidence originated in the overheard defendant-attorney con-
versation; 35 and ultimately (4) whether the agent's intrusion into de-
fendant's attorney-client communications demonstrated or
threatened any specific prejudice to the defendant's preparation for
or conduct of the trial.3 6
The Court found: (1) the government's purpose for the intrusion
was legitimate, e.g., to protect Weatherford's cover and personal
safety;37 (2) Weatherford did not report on the meeting to his superi-
ors nor to the prosecution;38  (3) none of the state's evidence
originated in the overheard conversations; 39 and (4) the intrusion did
not result in, nor threaten, any specific prejudice to defendant's trial
preparation or trial conduct.40
The Court held that governmental intrusions into attorney-client
communications are unconstitutional if they result in trial prejudice
against the defendant.41 However, there can be no sixth amendment
violation unless the informant's conduct resulted in at least a realis-
tic possibility of injury to the defendant or benefit to the prosecu-
tion.42 The Court indicated that prejudice may be produced if any of
34. Id. at 548-50.
35. "[W]hen conversations with counsel have been overheard, the constitutional-
ity of the conviction depends on whether the overheard conversations have produced,
directly or indirectly, any of the evidence offered at trial." Id. at 552.
36. Id. at 550. Tape recordings of conversations between defendant and counsel
entitled defendant to a "judicial determination" of whether "the monitoring of conversa-
tions between [Black] and his attorney had [any] effect upon his conviction or the fair-
ness of his trial." Id. at 551 (quoting Brief for the United States at 4, Black v. United
States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966) (No. 1029)).
37. Id. at 557. The Court noted that the informant attended the meeting at the
defendant's request, and not as a means of spying upon the defendant's trial prepara-
tions. Id.; see also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (effective law
enforcement necessitates utilization of undercover police agents); Rovario v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53, 59, 62 (1957) (the desirability and legality of continued secrecy
after arrest).
38. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 549. The Supreme Court rejected the court of ap-
peal's finding that Weatherford was himself a "member of the prosecution." Id. (quoting
Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1975)).
39. Id. at 556. Specifically, the Court noted that the informant did not testify
about the attorney-client conversations he overheard. The Court also distinguished third
party sources of overheard defense strategy information from electronically overheard
defense strategy information. Id. at 551; see also Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26
(1966) (electronic surveillance of attorney-defendant meeting constitutes a prejudicial
sixth amendment violation, whether or not the improperly obtained information was a
source of evidence used against the defendant). Contra Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 567
(Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
40. "As long as the information possessed by Weatherford remained uncommuni-
cated [to his superiors or to the prosecution], he posed no substantial threat to Bursey's
Sixth Amendment rights [to counsel]." Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 556.
41. Id. at 552.
42. Id. at 558.
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the following occur: (1) The informant testifies at defendant's trial
about the defendant's conversations with his attorney; (2) any of the
state's evidence originates in the attorney-client conversations; (3)
the overheard conversations are used in any other way to the defend-
ant's substantial detriment; or (4) the prosecution learns about trial
preparation details from an undercover agent who overheard defend-
ant-attorney conversations.43
The Court did not expressly place the burden of production upon
the defendant. However, this is the effect of the Court's decision."
The Court expressly refused to assume that a law enforcement
agent's intrusion into the defendant-attorney relationship is unjusti-
fied and prejudicial to the defendant.45 Yet, at the same time it is
43. Id. at 554. These factors are also factors to determine whether the burden of
persuasion has been satisfied on the issue of prejudice.
44. Cutillo v. Cinelli, 485 U.S. 1037, 1037 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., White &
O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). The test to determine who bears the burden of production
considers which party would be successful if no evidence at all was given, or if no more
evidence was given at a particular point in the case. Thayer, Burdens of Proof, 4 HARV.
L. REv. 45 (1890); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text. Here, the government
would win if no evidence at all was given on the issue of sixth amendment violation.
Thus, the defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to support her sixth amend-
ment violation argument that the undercover agent's conduct violated her sixth amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel.
If the burden of production were allocated to the government, the government would
be required to produce evidence whenever the defendant merely raised the issue. A quin-
tessential example of an issue where the government bears the burden of production is
the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial confession. The government must produce
evidence that the confession was voluntary, as an eyidentiary foundation, before the con-
fession is admitted into evidence. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
Scrutiny of the Court's precise words reveals that Weatherford did not allocate the
burden of persuasion to the defendant. The Court merely required the defendant to pro-
duce evidence that the government's conduct created a "realistic possibility" of detri-
ment to the defendant or benefit to the prosecution. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558. The
burden of persuasion on evidentiary issues traditionally involves a "more likely than not"
standard.
Realistic possibility is a lower standard of proof than "more likely than not." Realistic
possibility is a standard of proof consistent with a burden of production, and is inconsis-
tent with the heavy burden of persuasion.
45. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 556-57. The Court explained that placing the bur-
den of production upon the defendant was aimed at preventing a defendant from receiv-
ing judicial remedy for government conduct that could be justified or purely unprejudi-
cial. The defendant's burden of production was specifically groomed to meet that goal
when the Court distinguished a law enforcement government agent from a prosecutorial
government agent for purposes of showing a realistic possibility of prejudice. Id. at 558.
Subsequently, the defendant's burden of production requires the defendant to show two
things: (1) A government agent was present during attorney-defendant trial preparation
meetings; and (2) the government agent's conduct created a realistic possibility of
prejudice to the defendant or benefit to the prosecution at trial. Id. In dicta, the Court
noted examples of how a defendant might satisfy her burden of production by showing
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not supposed to cripple the defendant's ability to assert constitution-
ally guaranteed rights.46 Defendant Bursey's case failed in large part
because he was unable to show that the undercover agent transmit-
ted any information about the defendant-attorney conversations to
the prosecution.4 7
C. United States v. Morrison: Defendant Bears the Burden of
Production on Issue of Prejudice
Four years after Weatherford, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Morrison.48 Defendant Morrison was indicted on two
counts of distributing heroin. She retained private counsel. Thereaf-
ter, two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) met and
conversed with her without her attorney's knowledge, permission, or
presence. The agents knew defendant had been indicted and had re-
tained counsel. They hoped to convince her to become a government
informant. In the course of conversation, the agents criticized her
attorney's competence, offered benefits in exchange for cooperation,
and threatened a stiff jail sentence if she refused to cooperate. At no
time did defendant agree to cooperate with the DEA, incriminate
herself, or supply any information pertinent to her case.49
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the indictment on
the ground that the agents' conduct constituted a violation of defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.50
The court held that whether or not any tangible effect had been
demonstrated or alleged, the appropriate remedy was dismissal of
any one of the following to be true:
Had Weatherford testified at Bursey's trial as to the conversations between
Bursey and Wise; had any of the State's evidence originated in these conversa-
tions; had those overheard conversations been used in any other way to the
substantial detriment of [the defendant]; or even had the prosecution learned
from Weatherford, an undercover agent, the details of the Bursey-Wise con-
versations about trial preparations, Bursey would have a much stronger case.
Id. at 554. (emphasis added). These examples are consistent with a burden of production
and do not require the defendant to bear the heavy burden of persuasion. See supra note
43 and accompanying text; see also Note, The Improper Use of Presumptions in Recent
Criminal Law Adjudications, 38 STAN. L. REV. 423 (1986) (utilizing a rebuttable legal
presumption, in favor of P's position, is the logical equivalent of allocating the burden of
production to D).
46. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 545. The court of appeals' prophylactic per se rule
was rejected because it cut too broadly and provided the defendant with a windfall ofjudicial remedies for justified or harmless government intrusions upon defendant's right
to counsel, Id. at 557.
47. "[U]nless Weatherford communicated the substance of the Bursey-Wise con-
versations and thereby created at least a realistic possibility of injury to Bursey or benefit
to the State, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation." Id. at 558.
48. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
49. Id. at 362-63.
50. Id. at 363; see also United States v. Morrison, 602 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
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the indictment with prejudice. 51 The Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court assumed arguendo that the DEA agents' con-
duct violated defendant's sixth amendment rights and proceeded to
employ a balancing test to devise the appropriate remedy: "Cases
involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the general
rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the
constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on
competing interests. 52 Defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel was balanced against society's interest in effective law en-
forcement.5 3 Defendant's interest was defined in terms of the sixth
amendment's ability to assure fairness in the adversarial criminal
process. 4 Thus, sixth amendment deprivations cause injury requiring
judicial remedy when they prejudice defendant's ability to receive a
fair trial.55
Once again, the Court did not expressly allocate the burdens of
proof. However, the practical impact of Morrison was to allocate the
burden of production to the defendant on the issue of prejudice .5  In
Morrison, the deliberate nature of the agents' intrusion into defend-
ant's right to be represented by counsel was not independently suffi-
cient to show prejudice.5 7 Although dismissal was not appropriate,
the Court suggested that sixth amendment violations may be reme-
died in "other proceedings. ' 58 Allocation of the burden of production
to the defendant prevents the defendant from obtaining windfall ju-
dicial remedies.59 This suggestion indicates that a pretrial eviden-
tiary hearing may be appropriate in some cases involving sixth
amendment violations.60
51. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 363.
52. Id. at 364.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 365. Furthermore, certain violations of the right to counsel may be
disregarded as harmless error. Id.; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56. "Here, respondent has demonstrated no prejudice of any kind... to the abil-
ity of her counsel to provide adequate representation in these criminal proceedings."
Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364. "The Sixth Amendment violation... accordingly provides no
justification for interfering with the criminal proceedings against respondent Morri-
son. .. ." Id. at 366-67.
57. Id. at 366. The Court reversed the court of appeals' dismissal of the indict-
ment as too drastic. Id. at 367.
58. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
59. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 367.
60. See Cinelli v. City of Revere, 820 F.2d 474 (Ist Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub
nom. Cutillo v. Cinelli, 485 U.S. 1037 (1988). The Court may also be referring to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 proceedings.
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III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' DIVISION
Both Weatherford and Morrison implicitly allocate the burden of
production to the defendant. However, neither decision reached the
issue of who must bear the burden of persuasion 61 once the defend-
ant satisfies the burden of production. Three diverse and conflicting
views have developed in the circuit courts.
A. Burden of Persuasion on Prosecution
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals places the burden of persua-
sion upon the prosecution when deciding the issue of prejudicial sixth
amendment violations. In United States v. Levy,62 defendant Levy
was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin. Codefendant Viseg-
lia became a government informant and continued to attend defense
strategy meetings between Levy and his attorney. Viseglia communi-
cated to the prosecution that defendants were basing their defense
strategy upon the noncredibility of the government's two key
witnesses. 63
The circuit court interpreted Weatherford6 4 to suggest by negative
inference that either a prejudicial sixth amendment violation occurs
whenever defense strategy is communicated to the prosecution, or,
that public policy may define an appropriate allocation of the bur-
dens of proof because the Supreme Court has not expressly ad-
dressed instances where defense strategy is actually disclosed to the
prosecution.65 Policy considerations moved the Levy court to reject
the balancing test that would require courts to make "virtually im-
possible" speculations about prejudice, because the prosecution has a
multitude of opportunities to benefit from the improperly transmitted
61. The burden of persuasion is best understood as defining a zone in which the
facts of the case are too close for decision by the factfinder, and as providing a standard
for deciding such cases. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1300 (1977) [hereinafter Underwood,
Scales of Justice]. Allocating the burden of persuasion to the government enables the
defendant to win when the facts are too close for decision and is supported by language
used in the Weatherford holding, e.g., defendant must merely show a "realistic possibil-
ity" that a sixth amendment violation had prejudiced him or benefited the prosecution.
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558 (1977). Requiring a mere showing of a realis-
tic possibility of a threat is the logical equivalent of allowing the defendant to win when
the facts are too close for a decision. See also supra note 44.
62. 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978).
63. The district court found, and the circuit court noted, that the government also
learned that this was defendaiFt's only defense. Id. at 204.
64. "There being no tainted evidence in this case, no communication of defense
strategy [information] to the prosecution,. . .there was no violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment .. " Id. at 210 (quoting Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 554, 558). The negative infer-
ence of this statement would be that if there was any tainted evidence, or if there was
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information. 6 Thus, the defense satisfies its initial burden of produc-
tion upon showing that defense strategy was actually transmitted to
the government agent. 7 The defendant need not make an additional
showing of prejudice.68
The Levy court did not expressly place the burden of persuasion
upon the prosecution. However, the court held that the defendant
created a presumption of prejudice upon successfully showing that
the informant communicated defense strategy to his superiors or to
the prosecution.69 The presumption of prejudice also relieved the de-
fendant of any additional burdens of proof.7 0 Thus, the burden of
persuasion was, in effect, allocated to the government.7' Further-
more, the Levy court held that the presumption of prejudice is con-
clusive whenever disclosure of defense strategy becomes part of the
66. The opportunities for the prosecution to benefit from improperly transmitted
defense strategy information include further investigations of the case, subtle pretrial
discussions with potential witnesses, voir dire, jury selection, and during the trial itself.
Id. at 208.
67. Id. at 209.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1984) (the
third circuit's most recent case involving prejudicial sixth amendment violations), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985). The Costanzo court applied a three-branch test to deter-
mine whether defendant's sixth amendment rights were prejudicially violated.
The sixth amendment is. . .violated when the government (1) intentionally
plants an informer in the defense camp; (2) when confidential defense strategy
information is disclosed to the prosecution by a government informer; or (3)
when there is no intentional intrusion or disclosure of confidential defense strat-
egy, but a disclosure by a government informer leads to prejudice to the
defendant.
Costanzo, 740 F.2d at 254. The defendant bears the burden of production for each of the
three branches. The defendant creates a presumption of prejudice upon making a prima
facie showing that any one of the three branches are applicable to the case at bar.
Defense camp means a place where defense strategy is discussed and determined. See
Note, Government Intrusions into the Defense Camp: Undermining the Right to Coun-
sel, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1984) [hereinafter Note]. The Costanzo holding did not
interpret nor mention United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981). The first prong of
the Third Circuit's Weatherford test appears to be in direct conflict with Morrison. "Ab-
sent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof. . .dismissal of the indictment
is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate." Morrison,
449 U.S. at 362 (emphasis added).
70. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
71. The government must persuade the court that the improperly obtained infor-
mation does not constitute defense strategy. Accord Costanzo, 740 F.2d at 257. The
burden of persuasion is assigned whenever a presumption becomes an assumption. Ash-
ford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A
Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 172, 173 (1969) [hereinafter Ashford & Risin-
ger]; see also United States v. Cooper, 397 F. Supp. 277 (D. Neb. 1975) (prejudice will
be presumed if the informer transmits information on defense strategy to the govern-
ment); United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1976).
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public domain.7 2
B. Burden of Persuasion on Defendant
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals places both the burden of
persuasion and the burden of production on the defendant.1 3 In
United States v. Irwin, 4 defendant was arrested and charged with
possession of cocaine. In exchange for dismissal of the charge, de-
fendant agreed to become an informant for the Police Department.
The DEA suspected defendant of "double-dealing" by being an in-
formant and a drug dealer simultaneously. Defendant was prose-
cuted for subsequent sale of narcotics to a DEA agent. After charges
had been filed, but before trial, the DEA agent spoke to defendant
several times, without the knowledge and against the express admo-
nition of defendant's attorney. Defendant discussed defense strat-
egy"' and made incriminating statements1 7 during telephone conver-
sations with the DEA agent. The DEA agent taped the telephone
conversations and turned the tapes over to the prosecution. The pros-
ecution submitted the tapes to the trial court and successfully de-
feated defendant's motion to dismiss. 8 Defendant's inculpatory
statements contained in the taped conversation were suppressed at
trial.79
The Irwin court refused to provide an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine whether the improperly obtained information posed a substan-
tial threat of current or future prejudice to the defendant or benefit
to the prosecution. a The prosecution was never required to produce
trial evidence that the improperly obtained information was not used
72. Levy, 577 F.2d at 210. The information becomes part of the public domain
when it is improperly admitted into evidence at the criminal trial. "In our judgment, the
only appropriate remedy is the dismissal of the indictment .... The disclosed informa-
tion is now part of the public domain. Any effort to cure the violation by some elaborate
scheme... would involve the court in the same sort of speculative enterprise we have
rejected." Id.; see generally Ashford & Risinger, supra note 71, at 172, 173.
73. United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980); see also United States
v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1984) (nonprejudicial sixth amendment violation found
where informant in defendant's cell overheard and transmitted defense strategy to
prosecution).
74. 612 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1980).
75. Id. at 1188-89 n.17.
76. The DEA agent suggested to defendant that he ask his attorney to attempt to
reach an agreement with the U.S. Attorney, and the agent said he would call the U.S.
Attorney on defendant's behalf and tell him that defendant wanted "to talk to him or
whatever." The court found that defendant had previously told the government the na-
ture of his defense, e.g., defendant's criminal conduct was an effort to fulfill a previous
plea bargain. Id. at 1188.
77. Defendant admitted he was "purely on [his] own." Id. at 1187.
78. Id. at 1184 (district court granted government's motion to dismiss defendant's
42 USC § 1983 action).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1187.
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in trial preparation to the defendant's detriment.81 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of Weatherford tolerates government intrusions
upon a defendant's right to counsel as long as the prosecution does
not directly use the improperly acquired information against defend-
ant and to defendant's prejudice.8 2 The Irwin court noted Weather-
ford's rejection of a prophylactic per se sixth amendment violation
rule.83 Furthermore, the right to counsel "is only violated when the
intrusion substantially prejudices the defendant.""4
The Irwin Court interpreted the Weatherford guidelines 5 into a
four-prong test to determine when defendant's sixth amendment
rights are violated. Prejudicial sixth amendment violations occur
whenever any of the following occur: (1) Evidence is gained through
the interference with defendant's rights and it is used against the
defendant at trial; (2) the prosecution directly uses confidential in-
formation pertaining to the defense plans and strategy; (3) the gov-
ernment influence destroys defendant's confidence in his attorney; or
(4) the government takes other actions designed to give the prosecu-
tion an unfair advantage.8 6
The defendant bears a heavy burden of production under the
Ninth Circuit's four-prong test. In addition to showing that defend-
ant's right to counsel was intentionally invaded by government
agents and that the improperly obtained information was transmitted
to the prosecution, defendant must also show the specific ways in
which the prosecution used the improperly obtained information. 1
This transforms the defendant's burden of production into a heavier
burden that includes the burden of persuasion. In effect, the Ninth
Circuit allocates the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
81. Id. at 1186-87. The government produced affidavits denying prejudice. Id.
Contra United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3rd Cir. 1978) (prejudicial sixth amend-
ment violation occurs upon a showing that informant transmits confidential information
to prosecution, no additional showing of prejudice is required). "Where there is a know-
ing invasion of the attorney-client relationship and where confidential information is dis-
closed to the government, we think that there are overwhelming considerations militating
against a standard which tests sixth amendment violation by weighing how prejudicial to
the defense the disclosure is." Id. at 208.
82. Irwin, 612 F.2d at 1186-87.
83. Id. at 1185.
84. Id. at 1187 (emphasis added). Contra Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,
556 (1977) (defendant must make a showing of a realistic possibility of prejudice to
defendant or benefit to prosecution).
85. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
86. Irwin, 612 F.2d at 1187 (emphasis added).
87. Defendant must show as a matter of law that he is entitled to relief, if alleged
facts are proved, before an evidentiary hearing is granted. Id.
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C. Defendant Who Meets Burden of Production, Shifts Burden
of Production onto Prosecution. Prosecution Has the Burden of
Persuasion.
The First Circuit allows the burden of production to shift to the
prosecution when confidential defense strategy is improperly ob-
tained and transmitted to the prosecution. 8 The burden of persua-
sion is allocated to the prosecution. The defendant must satisfy her
burden of production as a prerequisite to activating the prosecution's
burden of persuasion.89 Defendant satisfies her burden of production
upon making a prima facie showing of prejudice.9 0
In United States v. Mastroianni,91 defendant was arrested for con-
spiracy to distribute cocaine. An informant was arrested and
charged as a coconspirator. The informant attended a defense strat-
egy meeting between defendant and defendant's counsel.92 The As-
sistant United States Attorney instructed the informant not to reveal
information about the pending criminal case to law enforcement offi-
cials. 3 However, government agents debriefed the informant about
the meeting on two separate occasions.94
The court held "that the government bears the burden of proving
the necessity for its representative to attend meetings between de-
fendants and their attorneys." In accordance with Weatherford v.
Bursey, the First Circuit found the government intrusion into the
defendant's sixth amendment rights was justified by a necessity to
preserve the informant's cover.98 Thus, the government successfully
met its burden of production on the issue of the initial intrusion upon
defendant's sixth amendment rights. However, the government
agents further intruded upon defendant's right to effective assistance
of counsel when they debriefed the informant about the defense
strategy meeting. The First Circuit court held that the government's
debriefing of the informant about the defense strategy meeting was
88. Cinelli v. City of Revere, 820 F.2d 474, 478 (Ist Cir. 1987) cert. denied sub
nom. Cutillo v. Cinelli, 485 U.S. 1037 (1988); United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d
900, 907-08 (1st Cir. 1984).
89. Cinelli, 820 F.2d at 478; Mastroianni, 749 F.2d at 907-08.
90. Cinelli, 820 F.2d at 478; Mastroianni, 749 F.2d at 907-08.
91. 749 F.2d 900 (Ist Cir. 1984).
92. Id. at 903.
93. Id. at 905.
94. Id. at 906.
95. Id. at 905.
96. "We recognize that automatically to require the government to ban an in-
formant's solicited attendance [at a defense meeting] would provide the defense with a
quick and easy alarm system to detect the presence of any informants, simply by inviting
all known associates of defendants to a supposed defense strategy meeting." Id. at 906.
The First Circuit rejected the government's argument the intrusion was justified by a
need to gather evidence regarding defendant's future criminal conduct. Id. Accord Wea-
therford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 556-57 (1977); see also supra notes 41-43 and accom-
panying text.
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an unjustified intrusion into defendant's constitutionally protected
attorney-client relationship.97
The Mastroianni court went on to consider who bears the burden
of persuasion on whether the intrusion constituted a prejudicial sixth
amendment violation. 8 The court expressly agreed with the Third
Circuit's99 determination that, "placing the entire burden on the de-
fendant to prove the disclosure and use of confidential information is
unreasonable." 00 However, the court also agreed with the Ninth
Circuit' 0' "that there are certain circumstances in which the revela-
tion of confidential communication by the informant is harmless." 02
The Mastroianni court held that defendant met its burden of pro-
duction, and made a prima facie case of prejudice upon showing that
the informant transmitted confidential information to the govern-
ment. However, the government met its heavy burden of persua-
sion 10 3 by producing enough evidence to establish that the inform-
ant's debriefing "did not in any way tend to suggest the appellant's
[the defendant's] defense strategy to the government." 0 4
Cinelli v. City of Revere'05 is the most recent First Circuit case
addressing the burden of persuasion for a prejudicial sixth amend-
ment violation. In Cinelli, defendant was arrested and indicted for
armed robbery and attempted murder. Defendant retained counsel.
Unable to post bail, defendant was incarcerated. Four days later,
detectives went to the jail to interrogate defendant in the absence of
counsel. The detectives deliberately violated defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel when they continued to interrogate the
defendant after he expressly asked to have his attorney present. 06
Defendant subsequently told the detectives that he was depending
97. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d at 907.
98. The Mastroianni court discussed the split of authority among the circuit
courts. Id.
99. See United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978); see also supra notes
69-72 and accompanying text.
100. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d at 907.
101. See United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980); see supra notes
85-87 and accompanying text.
102. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d at 907.
103. "The burden on the government is high because to require anything less
would be to condone intrusions into a defendant's protected attorney-client communica-
tions." Id. at 908.
104. Id. The court also noted that the government's evidence established that the
government knew, prior to the informant's attendance at the defense strategy meeting,
that the defendants were trying to establish legitimate sources for their illicit money. Id.
105. 820 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1987).
106. Id. at 476.
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upon an alibi defense strategy and gave them the names of his two
alibi witnesses. 10 7 The detectives communicated this defense strategy
information to the prosecution. The prosecution used this improperly
obtained evidence in preparing their motion for summary judgment,
which the district court granted.10 8
The First Circuit reversed the summary judgment and remanded
the case to the district court. The court noted "that a Sixth Amend-
ment violation cannot be established without a showing that there is
a 'realistic possibility of injury' to defendant or benefit to the
State." 109 The court then held that defendant made a prima facie
showing of prejudice "by establishing that defense strategy was com-
municated to the detectives.""l 0 Defendant's showing created a ques-
tion of material fact and prohibited the granting of a summary judg-
ment.1 ' Upon remand, prosecution must bear the burden of
production and persuasion to show that the improperly obtained in-
formation resulted in no prejudice to the defendant and no benefit to
the prosecution." 2 The First Circuit suggested that the government
may satisfy its burdens of proof by producing enough evidence to
establish that the government knew defendant was relying on an al-
ibi defense and knew the names of the alibi witnesses prior to the
improper interrogation."'
IV. ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION
Neither the prosecution nor the defense is allocated the burden of
persuasion for all possible issues that might arise at trial." 4 For most
issues, the burden of persuasion has traditionally been decided by
statute or by case law. However, when new issues arise, courts, out
107. Id. at 478.
108. Id. at 479 (the district court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment against defendant's action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
109. Id. at 477 (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558 (1977)). The
Cinelli court is in accordance with the Mastroianni court. See supra notes 105-08 and
accompanying text; see infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
11. Id. Contra United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978) (disclosure of
defense strategy to prosecution, by itself, creates a sufficient showing of prejudice).
112. Cinelli, 820 F.2d at 478. The Cinelli court noted that the record did not pro-
vide adequate information to determine whether the prosecution benefited from the im-
properly obtained information. Id.
113. Id. This suggests adopting the "independent source doctrine" from the fourth
amendment's exclusionary rule. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1985).
114. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (allocating burden of per-
suasion to defendant to prove extreme emotional disturbance as mitigating element of
murder); Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976) (allocating the burden of persuasion
to defendant on issue of insanity as affirmative defense to murder charges); Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (allocating burden of persuasion to prosecution to prove
malice aforethought as an element of murder conviction); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (allocating the burden 'of persuasion to the prosecution for each and every fact
necessary to constitute the crime charged).
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of necessity, must determine which side bears the burdens of proof.
A single method of allocation is not consistently utilized." 5 Professor
McCormick asserted that the only consistently applied method of al-
location ultimately results from balancing the relative weight "that
is given to any one of several factors, including: (1) the natural ten-
dency to place the burden on the party desiring change, (2) judicial
estimates of probabilities, (3) convenience, (4) fairness, and (5) spe-
cial policy considerations."" 6 Policy considerations ultimately deter-
mine the relative weight of these competing factors. 117
A. The Natural Tendency to Place the Burden on the Party
Desiring Change
The plaintiff is traditionally the party seeking change. The plain-
tiff has brought the action to court in search of a judicial order alter-
ing the current state of affairs between the parties. The burden of
persuasion is traditionally assigned to the party bringing the action
in both civil 1 8 and criminal" 9 cases. The defendant traditionally
bears the burden of persuasion on affirmative defenses. 20
In sixth amendment violation cases, the government is the party
seeking change. In the name of law enforcement, the government is
seeking judicial tolerance of deliberate intrusion upon defendant's
constitutionally protected right to have the assistance of counsel' as
a "medium" between the defendant and his adversary, the state.'122
Absent conflicting interests, the government's intrusion would consti-
tute an unjustified violation of defendant's sixth amendment




118. Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 112 F.2d 234 (8th Cir.) (party who has
burden of pleading a fact is allocated the burden of production and the burden of persua-
sion), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 699 (1940).
119. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (prosecution has burden of persua-
sion on every element necessary to constitute the crime charged).
120. Schmitz v. Mathews, 133 Wash. 335, 233 P. 660 (1925) (defendant has bur-
den of persuasion for affirmative defense of contributory negligence); see also Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (defendant has the burden of persuasion for affirmative
defense of insanity).
121. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (burden of persuasion allo-
cated to government to prove defendant waived his right to assistance of counsel during
custodial interrogation).
122. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
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rights. 2 ' This factor would weigh on the side favoring allocation of
the burden of persuasion to the prosecution.
B. Judicial Estimates of the Probabilities
It is inevitable that in some cases the trier of fact will come to an
erroneous conclusion of fact.1 4 Allocating the burden of persuasion
is essentially allocating the risk of failure of proof.125 Judicial esti-
mates of the probabilities allocate the burden of persuasion to the
"party who contends that the more unusual event has occurred.' 26
Here, the issue is prejudice caused by government transgression of
constitutional safeguards. 27 Sixth amendment rights are specifically
designed to prevent trial prejudice within the competitive context of
law enforcement. 28 Violation of procedural safeguards specifically
designed to protect against trial prejudice renders the claim of no
prejudice more unusual than a claim of prejudice. The defendant
and society rely upon the judiciary to diligently enforce these proce-
dural safeguards. Diligent enforcement warrants government justifi-
cation for unjustified intrusions into the defendant's right to counsel.
Furthermore, precious constitutional rights, such as a defendant's
right to counsel, need "breathing space to survive.' ' 2 9
The burden of persuasion is best understood as defining a zone in
which the facts of the case are too close for decision by the
factfinder, and then as providing a consistent standard for deciding
such cases.' 30 Judicial estimates of probabilities must ultimately con-
sider the severity of hardship caused by an erroneous judgment. In
civil cases, an erroneous judgment may cause serious financial injus-
tice. l ' However, an erroneous criminal judgment may cause a more
transcending injustice. 32 "Where one party has at stake an interest
of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this
margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the
other party the burden. . .of persua[sion]."' 33 This factor would
123. "[R]emedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional
violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests." United States v.
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
124. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
125. MCCORMICK, supra note 115, at 950.
126. Id. For example, it is unlikely that business services are provided gratuitously,
and the party claiming gratuitous service is allocated the burden of persuasion on the
issue. Carrill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q.B. 256 (1893).
127. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
128. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
129. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 565 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130. Underwood, Scales of Justice, supra note 61.
131. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
132. See id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also MCCORMICK, supra note
115, at 362.
133. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
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weigh in favor of allocating the burden of persuasion to the
government.
C. Convenience
Bentham argued that the burden of persuasion should be placed
"on whom it sits the lightest."'3 4 Courts often assign the burden of
persuasion to the party who has peculiar knowledge of the relevant
facts.' 35 Here, the government discovers relevant information by in-
vading the defendant-attorney relationship. Only the government
knows whether the information was transmitted to the prosecution,
whether the improperly obtained information was used to the de-
fendant's prejudice or the prosecution's benefit, and whether the
transmitted information contained defense strategy details. Thus, the
government has peculiar knowledge of the relevant facts. This factor
weighs heavily in favor of allocating the burden of persuasion to the
government.136
D. Fairness
The sixth amendment provides that an accused shall enjoy the
right "to have the effective assistance of counsel for his
defen[s]e." 37 The right to the effective assistance of counsel is not
recognized for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the
"ability of the accused to receive a fair trial."'38 Defendant's ability
to receive a fair trial depends upon the court's ability to preserve the
adversary nature of the criminal justice system.
The First and Third Circuits recognize that allocating the burden
of persuasion to defendant is unduly prohibitive and fundamentally
unfair. "It would be virtually impossible for [a defendant] or a court
to sort out how any particular piece of information in the possession
of the prosecution was consciously or subconsciously factored into
each of [the government's] decisions."'3 9 Furthermore, the adver-
134. J. BENTHAM, WORKS vi, 139, 136 (1962).
135. MCCORMICK, supra note 115, at 952.
136. The First Circuit and the Third Circuit have expressly recognized this factor
in allocating the burden of persuasion to the government on this issue. "[Placing the
entire burden on the defendant to prove both the disclosure and the use of confidential
information is unreasonable." United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir.
1984). Accord United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3rd Cir. 1978); Briggs v. Goodwin,
698 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
137. U.S. CoNsT.'amend. VI.
138. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 651 (1984).
139. United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (Ist Cir. 1984) (quoting
1163
sarial nature of criminal justice severely limits defendant's access to
the relevant facts necessary for successful persuasion.140 Successful
persuasion by the defendant would require him to virtually discover
the prosecution strategy, thereby threatening further breakdown of
the adversary nature of the criminal justice system. 141 Placing the
burden of persuasion uponthe defendant who has limited access to
relevant facts seriously cripples her ability to effectively seek judicial
remedies.' 42 Defendant's inability to prove prejudice would facilitate,
instead of deter, governmental infringements on her right to coun-
sel. 143 It also reduces the defendant's ability to prepare an effective
defense.44 Fairness considerations support allocating the burden of
persuasion to the government.
E. Special Policy Considerations
Judicial remedies for sixth amendment violations are the product
of balancing two competing policy interests: (1) the defendant's in-
terest in receiving effective assistance of counsel (a fair trial) against
(2) society's interest in effective administration of criminal justice.' 4
Judicial determination of their relative weight ultimately decides
who shall bear the burden of persuasion on the prejudice issue.146
I. Defendant's Interest: Effective Assistance of Counsel
and Receiving a Fair Trial
"Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be rep-
resented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his
ability to assert any other right.", 47 Thus, protecting the defendant's
sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel from
government infringement is an essential means of promoting the de-
fendant's interest in receiving a fair trial. The right to the effective
Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 494-95 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
140. "There is not general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case."
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (defendant does not have a right to
discover the identity of prosecution's witnesses).
141. See generally Note, supra note 69.
142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
143. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d at 908. The burden of persuasion must be allocated to
the government "because to require anything less would be to condone intrusions into a
defendant's protected attorney-client communications." Id.
144. "It is vain to give the accused a day in court, with no opportunity to prepare
for it." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932) (quoting Commonwealth v. O'Keefe,
298 A. 169, 173, 148 Pa. 69, 73 (1930)).
145. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
146. Id. This commentator notes that it may be difficult to determine which came
first, the allocation of the factors' relative weights or the allocation of the burden of
persuasion. The ultimate answer remains that the two are intimately intertwined.
147. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (quoting Schaefer, Feder-
alism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)).
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assistance of counsel has been expanded to include the right to repre-
sentation at critical pretrial proceedings.' 48 The sixth amendment
also involves defendant's right to confidentially prepare a defense
strategy.' 49 The adversarial nature of criminal proceedings inher-
ently requires protecting attorney-client communications, especially
defense preparations, from government infiltration. 150
The fundamental role of the right to counsel warrants an affirma-
tive judicial role in deterring government infringements. 1 1 "Scrupu-
lous adherence to constitutional procedures as well as substantial
fairness in applying them may foster a belief in the importance of
these procedures and thereby affect the discretionary decisionmaking
of actors in the drama of the criminal trial."'5 2 Judicial remedies
may effectively deter the government from intruding upon an ac-
cused's right to counsel by excluding all evidence that is directly or
indirectly the product of the intrusion. 53 The indirect products of
the intrusion may be so omnipotent that dismissal is the only realis-
tic method of deterrence. The defendant must be able to satisfy the
requisite burdens of proof before the issue is ripe for judicial remedy.
Thus, allocating the burden of persuasion to the defendant would
dramatically restrict access to judicial remedies for sixth amendment
violations. 54 A right without a corresponding remedy for violation of
that right is an illusory right. The burden of persuasion must be allo-
cated to the government to effectively deter sixth amendment viola-
tions. 55 If preserving the sanctity of a defendant's right to counsel
were the only relevant policy consideration, the courts would adopt a
per se rule deeming any transgression to be unconstitutionally
148. "[T]he most critical period of the proceedings. . .when consultation, thor-
ough-investigation and preparation [are] vitally important, the defendants. . .[are] as
much entitled to such aid [of counsel] during that period as at the trial itself." Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). "[T]he right to use counsel at the formal trial [would
be] a very hollow thing [if], for all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured
by pre-trial examination." In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
149. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 563 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"The essence of the Sixth Amendment's right is. . .privacy of communications with
counsel." Id. (quoting United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974)).
150. See Note, supra note 69, at 1147-51.
151. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967); O'Brien v. United
States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967); see also supra note 148 and accompanying text.
152. See Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REV.
814, 818 (1970).
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
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prejudicial.
2. Society's Interest: Effective Administration of
Criminal Justice
Society has an interest in convicting perpetrators of crime. Gov-
ernment intrusions into defendant's right to counsel may often fur-
ther this societal goal. The improperly obtained information is relia-
ble because a defendant's efforts to receive effective representation
encourages her to tell her attorney the truth. In addition, the ac-
cused offers the information to her attorney voluntarily. Indeed, the
defendant rarely alleges that improperly acquired information is
false or unreliable.158 Excluding potentially relevant and reliable in-
formation may cost society access to valuable evidence necessary to
secure a conviction of a defendant.157 Society's interest in convicting
more perpetrators of crime could be facilitated by allocating the bur-
den of persuasion to the defendant. This would reduce the number of
perpetrators who are acquitted, not because they are not guilty in
fact, but because the government made a procedural mistake during
the criminal proceedings. Allocating the burden of persuasion to the
government will add another thread to the endless web of criminal
procedure that reduces the effectiveness of law enforcement. The de-
fendant should not be compensated for the government's mistake if it
causes her no injury. Society ultimately bears the burden in terms of
less effective law enforcement. Thus, the burden of persuasion should
be allocated to the defendant.
However, "[i]f the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the
effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something
very wrong with that system."'158 Society's interest in the effective
administration of criminal justice is served by measures that preserve
the integrity of the criminal justice system itself. At first impression,
it may seem harmless to intrude upon a defendant's constitutionally
protected attorney-client relationship when the intrusion benefits the
prosecution of a defendant who has undeniably violated a law. But,
society must beware of "the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; . . .illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure.' 59 Recurrent violations of
constitutional safeguards, even in pursuit of convicting heinous de-
fendants, ultimately contaminate the judicial process and undermine
156. "[O]ur Constitution, and our criminal justice system, protect other values be-
sides the reliability of the guilt or innocence determination." Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570, 588 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 590.
158. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
159. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
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society's confidence in the administration of justice.160 Thus, society's
interest in effective administration of criminal justice can be served
by deterring even the mildest of government intrusions into an ac-
cused's constitutionally protected right to counsel. Intrusions can be
deterred by requiring the government to justify the intrusion, eg, by
allocating to the government the burden of persuasion on the issue of
prejudice.
Effective administration of criminal justice often requires under-
cover police investigation."' Protecting the cover and personal safety
of undercover government agents may warrant limited government
intrusions into defendant's sixth amendment rights. 162 Recruiting po-
tential informants may also justify a limited degree of deliberate
government intrusions.163 These two societal interests-(1) protec-
tion of informant's cover, and (2) recruitment of undercover infor-
mants-must be narrowly construed. Government intrusions into de-
fendant's right to counsel may not be justified by a search for
evidence of future criminal conduct.1'6 Furthermore, "[t]he mere
recitation of the need to protect the informant" will not "relieve the
State of its obligation to respect the sanctity of the attorney-client
relationship and the defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.' 65
3. Balance
Weatherford and Morrison held that the defendant's right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel must be balanced against law enforce-
ment's need to use undercover agents. 6 "Our Constitution, unlike
some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused
to be advised by his lawyer.' 6 7 Sometimes, balancing these conflict-
ing interests requires judicial tolerance of government intrusions into
160. Note, Harmless Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 457 (1983); see generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (overruled by Katz v. United States, 399 U.S. 347
(1967)).
161. "Certain criminal offenses present the police with unique and difficult detec-
tion problems because they are committed privately between individuals who are willing
participants." Consequently, law enforcement often requires use of undercover govern-
ment agents or informants. W. LA FAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5.1, at
247 (1985).
162. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557 (1977); see supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
163. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
164. United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 905-06 (1st Cir. 1984).
165. Id. at 905.
166. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 361; Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 545.
167. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
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defendant's right to counsel.1 68 The Supreme Court expressly "did
not hold that the sixth amendment right to counsel subsumes a right
to be free from intrusion by informers into counsel-client consulta-
tions."1 9 Society's interest in effective criminal justice through the
use of undercover agents outweighs defendant's right to communi-
cate confidentially with his attorney unless the agent interferes with
defendant's attorney-client relationship in ways that cause prejudice
to the defendant or benefit to the prosecution.170 Therefore, the bal-
ance must also reflect that confidential information transmitted to
the prosecution may not include defense strategy information. 1'
The First Circuit has achieved a just balance of the competing
interests involved in sixth amendment cases. The defendant must
present a prima facie showing of prejudice before the court will con-
sider whether the government informant's intrusion into defendant's
right to counsel was prejudicial.'72 This is a heavy burden for the
defendant to bear due to defendant's lack of access to the relevant
facts.'7 3 This burden ensures that a defendant will be unable to
claim prejudice unless there is at least a realistic possibility of
prejudice. 17 4 Thus, society's undercover law enforcement efforts will
not be easily thwarted, and undercover agents may continue to pro-
vide relevant and reliable evidence in an effort to convict perpetra-
tors of crime. The burden on the government is also heavy "because
to require anything less would be to condone intrusions into a de-
fendant's protected attorney-client communications.' 75 The govern-
ment's heavy burden of persuasion protects defendant's interest in
the effective assistance of counsel.
The Third Circuit makes a valuable contribution to balancing the
competing interests by distinguishing cases where the improperly ob-
tained information contains defense strategy and is transmitted to
the government. 176 Once defense strategy has been leaked to the gov-
ernment, the damage is irreversible. 7
168. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364-65.
169. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 553 (1977).
170. See id. at 557-58.
171. United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir. 1984).
172. Id. at 907-08. A prima facie showing of prejudice involves producing evidence
that: (1) a government agent confronted the defendant after formal charging, and in the
absence of defendant's counsel; (2) the government agent's improper conduct provided
the agent with information that could be used to benefit the prosecution or to cause
prejudice against the defendant; and (3) the government agent directly or indirectly
transmitted the improperly obtained information to the prosecution. Id.
173. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
174. Weatherford requires "at least a realistic possibility" of prejudice, not proof
of prejudice. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558.
175. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d at 908; see supra notes 99-100 and accompanying
text.
176. United States v. Levy, 557 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978).
177. Id.
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The Supreme Court has clearly established that a stricter stan-
dard must apply whenever a government agent improperly acquires
"defense plans and strategy and [defendant's] attorney's efforts to
prepare for trial, all of which [is] inherently detrimental to [defend-
ant], unfairly advantage[ous to] the prosecution, [and] threaten[s]
to subvert the adversary system of criminal justice.'1 78 Negative in-
ferences support a per se rule of prejudicial violations whenever de-
fendant satisfies his burden of production and makes a prima facie
showing that defense strategy was communicated to the
prosecution. 1 9
If such a per se rule were clearly established, the prosecution
would be motivated to produce evidence and expose the totality of
the circumstances in an effort to convince the court that the trans-
mitted information did not include any defense strategy information.
The courts would then be better able to distinguish harmless govern-
ment intrusions into the defense camp from those that threaten the
adversary nature of criminal proceedings. The Third Circuit ap-
proach fails to incorporate the Supreme Court's refusal to assume
that transmission of defense strategy to a government agent is the
equivalent of transmission of defense strategy to the prosecution. 80
The better rule is once defense strategy has been leaked to the prose-
cution, the damage is irreversible. In other words, transmission of
defense strategy to the prosecution is per se unconstitutional.
Thus, the proper balance of the competing interests involved
would produce the following allocations of the burdens of proof. The
defendant must produce evidence that: (1) a government agent con-
tacted the defendant, after formal charging and either undercover or
in the absence of defendant's attorney; (2) the government agent's
improper conduct provided the agent with information that could be
used to the defendant's detriment or to the prosecution's benefit; and
(3) the government agent directly or indirectly transmitted the im-
properly obtained information to the prosecution. Once the defend-
ant makes such a prima facie showing of prejudice, the courts must
determine whether the government intrusion caused a prejudicial vi-
olation of defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel. The government must bear the burden of persuasion on
the issue of prejudice. However, if the defendant also produces evi-
dence that the improperly obtained and transmitted information was
178. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 554, 558.
180. Id. at 556.
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defense strategy information, the government agent's improper con-
duct constitutes a per se prejudicial violation of defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The damage is
fatally irreversible. The case must be dismissed.181
V. CONCLUSION.
Twelve years ago, Weatherford v. Bursey8 2 left unanswered the
question of who shall bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of
prejudicial sixth amendment violations. The conflict needs to be re-
placed by a fair and consistent method of determining (1) when prej-
udicial sixth amendment violations occur, and (2) who shall bear the
burden of persuasion on the issue of prejudice. Combining the First
and Third Circuit approaches achieves a reliable method of protect-
ing defendant's constitutionally protected attorney-client relationship
while promoting society's interest in effective administration of crim-
inal justice.183
The burden of persuasion in criminal cases is traditionally allo-
cated to the government. The natural tendency to place the burden
on the party seeking change does not support allocating the burden
of persuasion to the defendant on the issue of prejudicial sixth
amendment violations. Neither do the judicial estimates of the
probabilities, convenience, and fairness or special policy considera-
tions. On the contrary, these factors clearly support placing the bur-
den of persuasion upon the government.
The government's access to relevant facts is a crucial factor within
the adversarial criminal context. Only the government has access to
the relevant facts necessary to establish whether the government in-
trusion caused prejudice to the defendant or benefit to the prosecu-
tion. The criminal context limits the defendant's ability for discov-
ery. Allocating the burden of persuasion to the defendant would
unjustifiably tip the adversarial scales of criminal justice in favor of
the government on the prejudice issue. The criminal context also in-
creases the detrimental effect of an erroneous judgment to tran-
scending proportions: the defendant has her liberty at stake. The de-
fendant must be given the benefit of the doubt whenever the case
facts are too close for the factfinder to decide. The risk of nonpersua-
sion should be allocated to the government. Therefore, once the de-
181. This position may be strongly opposed by analogizing sixth amendment viola-
tions involving defense strategy communicated to the prosecution to fifth amendment
violations involving transactional immunity and the defendant's right to not incriminate
himself. But this analogy is inaccurate and beyond the scope of this Comment. For an
excellent discussion see generally Beale & Bryson, GRAND JUR. L. & PRAC. § 9:19
(1986).
182. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
183. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
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fendant has met her burden of production concerning confidential
communication improperly obtained by government informers and
transmitted to the government, the burden of persuasion that no
prejudice resulted should be placed upon the prosecution.
Policy. considerations ultimately determine the relative weight of
competing factors. This commentator asserts that deterring govern-
ment violations of a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel
must be the most dominant policy consideration when allocating the
burdens of proof. Effective deterrence may be accomplished by pro-
viding judicial remedies whenever state action threatens prejudicial
sixth amendment violations. However, judicial remedies are accessi-
ble only after the defendant has satisfied the necessary burdens of
proof. Allocating the burden of persuasion to the defendant would
provide judicial remedies for prejudicial violations that a defendant
is able to prove, but not state actions that threaten prejudicial sixth
amendment violations. As outlined above, the burden of persuasion is
an extremely difficult burden for the defendant to bear. Therefore,
access to judicial remedies for sixth amendment violations is greatly
reduced by allocating the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
Providing a right to counsel while barricading access to judicial rem-
edies when it is violated reduces the right to an illusion. The burden
of persuasion must be placed upon the prosecution to deter unjusti-
fied intrusions into a defendant's right to counsel.
LORETTA A. NEARY-WEST
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